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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
HUBERT \\TOLFE, SHIR.LEY WOLFE,
his wife, ELLIOTT ''""OLFE, KA YL.A
\V.OLFE and ~lERRILL STRONG, copartner8, doing business under the fir1n
nan1e and st~~le of WOLFE'S DEPART)lENT STORE, and WOLFE'S DEp ART:JIEXT STO·RE, a co-partnership,
Plaintiffs .and Respondents

Case No.

7431

vs.
~ . .\R.A.H \\~RITE

and JAMES L. WHITE,

her husband,

Defendants and AppelZants.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT:S

STATEMENT
The ·principal question presented in this case is
whether an unqualified agreement between landlord and
tenant that the latter, for a recited valuable consideration accepts the premises, including an old building,
''in the condition and state of repair they are now in,''
is a valid covenant, enforceable between the contracting
parties; and whether a covenant to keep such condition
i1nposes a duty to change it.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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HISTORY OF LITIGATION
A brief history of this case will be of assistance in
showing how the points here presented arise.
The case was filed by respondents on a complaint
(1), which, as then filed, alleged a basis for claim, (a)
the lease between the parties, (b) defective construction
or insufficiency of the roof drain, and (c) that the roof
supports were inadequate, both as to ''design and construction.'' It alleged the duty of appellants to put both
in good condition, and our delict of such duty.
A demurrer (22) and a motion to strike (24) were
filed. The former raised the effect of the acceptance of
conditions complained of by the covenant of respondents,
and that no chU~nge in the roof had be;en alleged; and the
motion to strike, challenged a number of allegations, :particularly including the reference to the requirements of
Salt Lake City. It raised the grounds that the ordinance
pleaded and the expressions of opinion showed no ~e
quirement by public officials, and that, as between the
parties, the assertions by City authorities had no bearing
or materiality, and imposed no legal duty on us.
After these were argued, respondents filed a bill of
particulars (30). This is largely argument. It was apparently treated as an addition to the complaint, but
has been ignored.
Thereafter, and to meet the ground raised by the
general demurrer, respondents filed an amendment to
the complaint (36). This alleged a number of substantial
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changt)~

in the condition of the roof structure, after the
building had been accepted in the condition it was in,
and before respondent~ went into possession on June
6, 1946. -4\~ stated by this Court, in its opinion ton first
appeal (197 P. 2d 125, at 130), '·the ·plaintiffs do not,
at any point in their co1nplaint, indicate that the roof
'va~ not in ·good condition and repair' on that day."
The opinion then points !out that the letter of the City
Bureau of Inspection to respondents, p-leaded (18),
pointed out ''what the · defects are, and indicates also
that the roof drainage system had pToved ina:dequa te. ''
..A.lso, that at no time in either of the letters is there
any determination as to when the eondition first developed, or as to how long it has existed."
H

The opinion then (at p. 131) points out, at some
length, the allegations of this amendment to the complaint as to changes in the condition of the building,
after it was accepted by respondents. We quote as follows (p. 131):
''The plaintiffs by their a1nended con1plaint
allege that:

" '* * * after the lease was entered into
the roof commenced to sag * * * which sagging
gradually became worse. * * * that in January
1946 the plaintiffs first learned that the roof
was actually dangerous .and unsafe * * * that
the said roof was unsafe and was not in good
condition a.nd repa.ir .a.t that time in January 1946)
(not date of lease) a.nd beca;ne p.rogressi,oely
worse so that when plaintiffs were to take physical possession of the property the roof ha,d
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become so unsafe as to be dangerous to life and
limb * * * that the sagging of the roof became
p~rogressiv~ely W'O·rse and the roof was dangerous

and unsafe because of the matters and things
heretofore set forth and because of the * * *
(Here the complaint sets out the exact defects),
* * * and on 0T about June 7, 1946 by reason of
said conditions the roof had become ·dangerous
and unsafe * * * that plaintiffs do not kno'v when
the said roof first becarne dangerous and unsafe
but the said unsafe condition beran~e progJ~essive
ly worse frorn the d~ate of sa.id lease * * *' (Italics
added.)
1

''The pleadings obviously refer t~o condition~
after the execution of the lease."
Obviously, this Court attached great importance to
these allegations of changes in conditions of the building.
The reference in the opinion to the conditions pointed out by the City Inspector on April 29, 1946, is to a
letter of that date (18), which states "that the trusses
were not adequate both as to desi_gn and as to erection.
Also, that the main ceiling beams both for the front and
rear part of the store are sagged and are evidently too
light to carry the roof load. Also that the roof drainage
system has proved to be inadequate.''
These encompassed all of the conditions objected to.
This letter also points out, after stating the opinion of
the authorities, the full measure of any action taken or
indicated by them. It said: "These factors make it mandatory upon me to refuse to allow continued occupancy
of this structure beyond this summer season for fear of
future heavy snow loading which might cause total heam
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and trn~s failure and eonsequent collapse of the roof
structure.''
These 'opinions of the City authorities, while they
"-ere used throug·hout the trial to greatly influence the
jury, were finally re1noved fron1 the case, as a basis of
duty or liability, by an instruction of the court (149),
and are no longer of importance as constituting any
basis of right or duty.
This instruction \Yas that the responsibility of the
defendants was not to be determined ''by any act or
finding of the building inspector . . . the defendants'
only obligation 'vas, as provided in the lease, to keep
the roof of said building in good condition and repair.''
'Vhile the jury were also told, in different ways, by the
Court repeatedly that "keep," as used, meant "put" in
good condition, this instruction eliminated any issue
as to ''official requiren1ents.'' It is the law of the case.
After this amendment, the demurrer was renewed
as to the comp~laint, as amended ( 43), and a new motion
to strike ( 44) was filed. The demurrer raised the same
matters. The motions to strike were directed to three
alleged matters: (1) the intimated official requirements
(2) the alleged oral statements made prior to the execution of the lease, and (3) the alleged changes in condition, after its execution. As stated, ( 1) is now out.
No evidence was offered on (2). And, the motion as
to ( 3), on the grounds urged both in the Court below
and here, are not now vital, for the reasons referred to
belo,v, in the argument.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

6

There was also, incidentally, a motion to strike the
allegation that defendant James White drew the lease.
Since there is no ambiguity in the lease, no rule of constructi1on as to this is involved. This record shows, incidentally, that Mr. Wolfe was well able to take care
of himself.
Thereafter, this general demurrer was again sustained, and the special den1urrers and motions to strike
were overruled (49). The respondents stood on these
pleadings, and the first appeal was taken (60).
On appeal, as ~ited above, the opinion of this Court
reversed the Trial Court, ap·parently by reason of the allegations of changes in the conditions after the lease, as
above quoted, from page 131 of this Court's opinion, and
influenced perhaps by reason of the fact that it was then
assumed that the alleged ''acts or ·findings'' of the
City Inspector constituted ''requirements of public
authorities,'' as discussed at pages 130 and 131 of the

..

OplnlOD.

On trial of the ca.se, as indicated by instructions
which will be hereinafter referred to, the trial went upon
the general theory that our liability had been settled
by this Court, and that the matter for trial was the
amount of damage we should pay.
We proceeded with the trial, expecting that s1ome
evidence of change in structure would be introduced, pursuant to the amendment to the complaint. This amendInent was used, however, merely for the purpose of
getting past the demurrer and app·eal. No evidence was
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introdncPd of anY~ chano·e
after the lease was sie:ned
b
'
~
and before the building- \Ya:s torn out.
\Y. e, on the

~other

hand, introduced some evidence,
and the evidence generally showed, without contradiction,
that there had been no change. The Trial Court took the
position that he understood the decision of this Court
"~as to the effect that the covenant to ''keep'' the roof
in good repair meant that we were to "put" it in such
repair, both as to the drainage system and roof sup·port,
and the case was :so ruled. (See instructions, 144-147,
153-154, and, also, the form of verdict, 165).
1

Our requests for special interrogatories nn the point
a~ to whether there had been any change, was denied
( 116). ..A.s were, also, our motions ( 972) and our requests
for a directed verdict (118), and our other requests to
subn1it the question of change, if any, to the jury (See
119, 121, 123).

STATEMENT OF FAC'TS
The facts material to: an understanding of the questions raised on appeal will be stated as concisely as
possible. These are, for the most part, not in dispute.
Some matters which were in dispute, were within the
province of the jury to determine, and are not material
here.
The building involved here, except the rear or west
wall, and the baJeony joined thereto, was constructed
about 1902 (689). In 1922, it was rernodeled under the
supervision of Miles Miller, architect ( 689). ·So that
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

8

the building, a.t the time t~is lease was entered into, was
about 43 y~ars old, and, at the time of the expiration of
the lease, would be 63 years old. The defendant Mrs.
White acquired it about January 1, 1943.
The remodeling in 1922 and 1923 was by the Halloran Judge Trust Company, and was for the purpose
of occupancy by the J. C. Penney Store, which occupied
it until about 1936 (781). A new roof thereon was installed in May of 1937, after Penney's moved out, by
the Layton Ro ofing Company of Salt Lake City (781),
prep:a.ratory to which some of the sheathing had been
taken off, and the underneath roof -structure examined
( 782), and tests made as to the vibration and strength of
the understructure ( 783).
1

At that time, or thereafter, it was leased to Stewart
Novelty Company, which, by the terms of the lease,
occupied it until about June 6, 1946 (802).
The lease here involved was executed February
19, 1945, to commence March 7, 1945, and, under which,
re-sp9ndents were to take possession June 6, 1946. This
lease is set out in full in the opinion of this Court on
former appeal (197 P. 2d 125).
The first question as to the roof arose in July or
August of 1945 (536), when respondents became dissatisfied with the roof drain system, as he testified (542),
and kept insisting that Mr. White ''assume the responsibility for diveTting this drain." Respondent claimed
that the drain was not carrying the water sufficiently
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a,,·ny. so that son1e \Vas g·etting into an unexcavated portion of the base1nent, fl"~om \vhich son1e allegedly seeped
through the foundation into the basement, and he proposed t\vo plans for correcting this (792).

The plan he \\·anted \Vas to tap the roof drain under
the floor of the building·, at the western extremity of
the building, and then run a pipe through the basement,
and di~harge the water at the front of the building (792).
Respondent said he wanted to have a ~'free flow of rain
water a'\\.,.ay from the building as . . . the function of
any roof'' ( 610).

On the change proposed by respondent, he employed
a roofer, and communicated that fact to appellant (541).
On October 9, 1945, ap,pellant wrote a letter (Ex. "H")
to respondent, stating that he had had "the flashings of
the roof fixed, and the Utah Roof Cement Comp~any
advises that the roof is now in good shape." Mr. B. T.
Cannon, the manager of that company, testified to this,
and that he had made the· examination and check of the
roof, as referred to in this letter (785). That it was then
in good condition.
Under date of November 12, 1945, resp,ondent obtained from a l\ir. Ferguson figures for making the
drain changes proposed. These are contained in Ex.
18, addressed to Mr. White. They included additional
pipe, and other equipment, and a drain or drip gutter
at the rear of the building. The total cost of this proposed change, as stated therein, was $485.86.
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Respondent testified that Mr. White said that he
would not go fior it, but did offer to make a compromise
to go 50-50, and that respondent told him ''that it was a
small item; if I thoug·ht the roof was my responsi,bility,
I would fix it myself'' (542). Mr. White testified that
respondent did ask him to pay the amount of the bill,
and that he asked respondent if he did not remember the
discussi on at the time the lease between them was made,
in which Mr. White said that he was confident that if he
cared to go to the expense and trouble of partitioning
the store, 'he would get $1,200.00 m.onthly rent instead
of the $600.00, as provided in the lease for the first ten
years, and that he was leasing it "as is" to avoid the
work and expense ''that had to be done to make this old
building into a modern store" (795). 'That it was not
"his duty to reconstruct" the drain system (697). That
conversation was in November of 1945, seven months
bef~re occupancy.
1

I

Except for the testimony of respondent and architect Paulson that they were in and out of the building
during 1945 ·and early 1946, to make measurements, etc.,
the next testimony in the record is that Mr. Paulson had
determined to get rid of the floor radiators, about 7 in
number, that were in the store, and to insulate the attic
for heating purposes (293). That he went into the attic
in January of 1946, and concluded that the roof or
ceiling structure would not support th·e additional 4
lbs. per square foot, which this insulation would impose
(294).
'

I
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On January 15, 1946, he wrote to Mr. Wolfe (Ex. 7),
hereinabove referred to, as to the drain, and also said
that the '•trussed rafters which form the roof franling
are way undersized for the load they now carry. The
girders bet\Yeen the colu1nns at the rear are also under
sized.'' Further he said, •~The skylights greatly weaken
the roof, saxne should be done away with and the trusses
carried through present area occup,ied by the skylights.''
The testiinony of architect Miller, as referred to,
"Ta8 that prior t~o the remodeling job in 1922 there had
been 9 skylig·hts. That 3 were then taken out and trussed
through, and that 6 remained (630). This witness also
testified that on the remodeling job which he did at that
tirne, the remodeling plans and specifications were filed
\Yith the City, and approved, and a permit issued (629).
This was the plan and the remodeling under City supervision, that existed there at the time that the lHase in
question was made. About Jan. 15, 1946, Mr. Paulson
called in the Building Inspector to talk over the conditions, as mentioned in this letter, and the Inspector asked
him to ''send it to me in writing'' (296).
Pursuant to this, the letter of Jan. 15, 1'946 (Ex.
6), appears to have been written to the InspHctor, and
which contains substantially the same statements as to the
drain and other conditions that were made to Mr. Wolfe
in Ex. 7.
The next was in a letter from the Building Inspector
to Mr. White, ,Jan. 22, 1946 (Ex. 2), in which the Inspector 1nade the same statements, in almost the sarne lanSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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guage, as to the structural defects, and in which he also
said that he believed ''this condition is not safe and
should be corrected. In case of a heavy snow, it will be
necessary to cl1ose the building from public use. ' ' The
building w·a.s continuously occupied by the Stewart Novelty Company up to June 6, 19·46 (802).
On March 11, 1946, respondent wrote to Mr. White
(Ex. "I"), enclosing Mr. Paulson's letter to him (Ex.
7). This was apparently the first communication between
them since the oral conversation of Nov. 19, 1945. This
letter of March 12, 1946, states, ''knowing how you feel
about the subject, I hesitated to bring it to your attention,'' and added that the condition must eventually be
corrected, and the best time to correct it was before the
remodeling in June. That plans for "correcting it"
should be made in advance. This letter als·o recited that
he wa.s exp·ecting to spend considerably more, and up to
three times the original estimate of $10,000.00, for remodeling, and, ''I am. sp~aring no expense to make this
location th~ showplace of the West.''
It then stated, "I grant that under conditions as
they n1ow exist I have a good lease,'' and added that
ap·pellant would he money ahead to make the peTmanent
roof repairs now. He said that he believed it was appellants' responsibility.
On March 13, 1946, Mr. White wrote an answer (Ex.
'' J' '), in which he stated that he wa.s not complaining
about the lease or the fact that the rent would be more if
they were to rewrite a lease, and stated that he drew the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

13
lease in the strongest \\'"ay possi·ble, so that appellants
would haYe no further expense with the property, except ··Keeping .. the roof in repair. He stated that he
did not have the lea~e before him, but if Mr. Wolfe would
look at it, he "\Yould find that it states definitely that
you accept the pre1nises in the condition they are in,''
and that, ''I feel . . . . just as you rightfully are taking
advantage of the low rental in the lease, you should not
call upon n1e to alter the terins of the lease.'' He added
that he could not see that running the pip·eline through
the basement, as he had requested, was a roof repair, and
that the rent · '\Yas fixed at the extraordinarily low figure of $600.00 per month for the equivalent of four store
rooms." That it was realized that a lot of money would
have to be spent, and that "It was because I didn't want
to go to the expense or trouble that I made you this low
rental.''
On March 20, 1946, architect Paulson filed an ap.plication with the City Inspector for remodeling the front
of the store.
On ~1arch 21, 1946, the Building Inspector (whose
title had been changed) wrote a letter (Ex. "B") to
~{r. Paulson, referring to the aprplica.tion, and in which
is repeated, aln1ost word for word, the statements made
in the previous letters by Mr. Paulson, and continually
repeated by the Building Inspector, as to the insufficiency of the rafters and roof framing and the girders
hPtween the columns at the rear of the store. It was
also stated that if the store ''is to be under continued
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'

occupancy this condition must he remedied and therefore
your application is .being held in abeyance until assurance is given that the :voof condition will be taken care
of. A plan showing your proposal will he expected.''
This letter states that Mr. White has been notifed, and
indicates that a copy of this letter was sent to him.

On Ap·ril 1, 1946, Mr. Wolfe (Ex. "K") answered
Mr. White's letter of March 13, 1946 (Ex. "J"). This
letter makes no denial as to the discussion of the matters of low rental and acceptance tof the building as it
was, in view of reduced rentals, but does say that Mr.
Wolfe is not satisfied that Mr. White's conclusions as
to liability are impartial. He added that he had taken
the matter up with his attorneys, and then makes a
formal
''demand upon the lessors to put the roof of said
~premises in ~a safe and proper condition, to meet
with the requirements of the Chief of Building
Inspection of Salt L.ake City, and also provide the
proper drainage facilities for said r01of.
''Unless prompt action is taken to remedy the
conditions as set forth above, I will cause the
proper work to he done to make the roof safe and
in good condition, which is your responsibility
under the lease, and will institute legal proceeding unde-r the lease to compel lessors to pay for
the cost of same and attorney fees.''
Respondents' attorneys had ''considerable to do''
with drafting this demand (See Ex. ''M'').
It will be noticed that, commencing at about this
time, or. a little before this, res:pondents and their archi-
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teet had deter1nined that they \Vould get the interior posts
and construction out of this store entirely, and a full
span bo,vstring steel ~tructure installed. The evidence
plainly indicates that they were determined to get such
construction at the expense of the appellants. 'The further efforts \\Tere directed to this, and to collecting evidence of defects in the structure, as it had existed.
It should ~so be noted that, while the Building In~pector had requested assurance that the roof would be
1nade safe, no such assurance was given hy the architect
filing the application, or at all.
On April 2, 1946, Mr. White wrote Mr. Wolfe (Ex.
· 'L · '), acknowledging his letter of April 1, 1946, and
stated that he had examined the lease, and then quoted
some language from the lease, and said :

''I suggest ... that you send me an itemized
statement of exactly the -vvork you contend the
lessors are obligated to do under their agreement to keep the roof in good condition and
repair."
He also asked Mr. Wolfe if he would advise who his
attorney is, so that he might talk to him.
On April3, 1946, by letter (Ex. ''M''), acknowledged
Mr. White's letter, and said:
"With reference to the itemized statement
which you request stating the exact work to be
done to make the roof in good condition and repair, this can best be obtained by consulting with
my architect Mr. A. B. Paulson, or by engaging
~on1e other co1npetent building engineer or architect.''
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He also added that his attorneys were Rich, Rich and
Strong, and that ''Benj. L. Rich of this firm ... had
'
considerable
voice in rendering the opinion referred to in
my letter of Aprills~t.' '
Mr. Paulson testified that he probably did know
that Mr. Wolfe, in his letter, had referred Mr. White
to him (415). He also said that he may have made the
statement, as testified to ~by Mr. Miller, in substance and
effect that he "wanted to have a clear span and that
was generally understood from the beginning, and that
the expense of it was worth it to the store'' (416). That
he ha:d "told Mr. W olfe that it would be a shame to
re-roof this thing without putting a clear span on it'';
that he told him that ''just p1rior to George Nelson laying
out the bowstring truss'' ( 416).
1

Mr. ·Wolfe testified tha:t he determined, after this
letter of Ap·ril 1, 1946, to p~roceed with fixing the roof
just as soon ~as he could get-a permit ('556). He also testified that he was the first to determine that he wanted
the open span roof; that it was his idea (963).
At this time, or just prior thereto, Mr. White asked
the City Inspector to meet him at the building, and this
was done (813). The Inspector, Mr. Tipton, when they
walked to the back of the store, -called attention to. a
girder near the West side of the building, running North
and South over the balcony. He pointed out that this
was bowed, and Mr. White could s·ee that it was (814).
This ceiling wnd1 girde.r, m.entioned in the letters as
"b~owed," above the balcony, however was never dis-
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this 'va~ no part of the new n1ain store recon~truction. This girder is still there, having been scabbed
on each side by 2'' pieces ( 527). This is the only timber
sag that, it \Ya8 agreed on both sides, was visible there.
It \Vas the sag expressly Inentioned in the architect's
and Inspector's lette·rs.

turbed,

a~

Archi teet _Jliller testified that this was bowed in the
~a1ne 'Yay, and to the same extent, soon after it was put
in, back in 1923, and had been in that eondition ever since
( 632). There is no dispute as to this.
~Ir.

Tipton also pointed out, what he referred to
as ··a point near the Southwest skylight,'' and asked if
:Jir. White could not see, by sighting over the ceiling,
that th'ere \Vas a deflection there. He seemed to see some
such at this point, and said he could see n'o other deflection, and asked ~1r. Tipton if he could see any other. He
then asked what should be done about it, and was told
by Mr. Tipton that he made no requirements, that they
would simply pass upon proposals, as they were made
(818).
On or about April 4, 1946, pursuant to Mr. Wolfe's
letter of April 3, 1946, Mr. White went also to see Young
and Hansen, architects (819), and they advised him that
l\Iiles Miller had been the archi teet on the remodeling
job in 1922 and 1923, and recommended that he see Mr.
Miller (819).
~fr.

White immediately contacted Mr. Mille'r, and
the two of the1t1 went to see architect Paulson, as had
been suggested. vVhile Mr. Paulson could not recall
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

18
the particular visit to his office, he did not deny the conversations testified to by Mr. White and Mr. Miller (413).
This wa.s about the 5th of Ap~ril, 1'946. Mr. White called
Mr. P~aulson's attention to the fact that he had requested
a statement as to what he should do, and had been referre~d by Mr. Wolfe to Mr. Paulson. Mr. White then
stated that there were two distinct questions involved:
one was, what work is there to be done on this roof structure; and the next one was, who was to pay for it. The
last question was one for_ him and Mr. Wolfe to work
out, and, on the first question, he would like these two
architects to discuss the question as to what was to be
done, and t o come to a conclusion, and advise on that
1

(821).

Mr. Miller, at· that time, made :a statement as to
what was required, suggesting that the skylights be
trussed in, and, if there was any shoring necessary
around the skylights, he suggested this he done, and,
if there was any strengthening neeessary, they could
go through and do this (822).
Mr. White then said for Mr. Paulso:r;t to go :ahead
on this p~roposal. (823). Mr. Paulson was not clear as
to this conversation, but testified that Mr. White "may
have suggested this" ( 416), and, also, that the foregoing
conversation with Mr. Miller and Mr. White ''could have
taken place''- (413). It was agreed that it was not discussed further by Mr. Paulson with Mr. White ( 418).
Mr. White testified that he waited to hear from Mr.
Paulsnn the outcome of the proposals made by 1\f.r. Miller (827).
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On . A. pril 22, 1946, res:pondent and Mr. Paulson employed Georg·e S. Nelson, a construction engineer ( 360).
He testified that the roof wa8 unsafe, and had been since
it \\~as designed on the plans approved in 1922. All of his
testimony \vas 'vith relation to this design and the alleged
faulty re1nodeling construction based thereon.
On . A. pril 29, 1946, the Building Inspector wrote another letter to ~Ir. Wolfe (Ex. "C "), referring to future
occupancy of the store, and stating that he had called
to the attention of .:Jir. White, as lessor, the same things
that had been repeated from the first letter of Mr.
PatllS'on, as to inadequacy of design and construction;
and then stated that it would be mandatory for him to
refuse to allow continued occupancy beyond the summer,
for fear of future heavy snow loading, which might cause
collapse.
,
:Jir. George Nelson wrote a letter May 8, 1946 (Ex.
'' F' '). This tends to indicates that no part of this roof
would ever hold up. This witness testified that he went
in, prior to the removal of the ceiling plaster, for one
hour, and didn't remember what part of the roof structure he got into (334). His testimony related to the oretical requirements and computations, and to the insufficiency of timber, nails and fastenings, as referred to in
Ex. '' F' '. He said the roof structure ''couldn't hold
up," and that "it shouldn't be standing at all" (334).
That it should have fallen down "years ago" (336).
H'owevrr, he found no changes from the original construction. He stated that the roof could be sup,ported,
1
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as it stood, but this would be impractical (357), and that
an open span construction would make a ''prettier store''
(332). This witness testified that he made a sketch, and
that Mr. Paulson thereon drew the plan for the open
store (331).
On June 14, 1946, Mr. Paulson wrote to Mr. Wolfe
(Ex. "E"), stating that the Inspe~tor would not g~rant
a building permit until a plan for a "code conforming"
roof were submitted. That complete measured drawings
showed the roof East of the balcony, "using :S:alt Lake
City Code as a standa;rd," to be entirely unsafe, "with
exceptions of the columns.'' He stated that to make it
safe would cost m'Ore than to remove the p-resent roof and
to '' p~ut 'On a good roof.'' He estimated, however, .a roof
without posts at $11,-680.00 cost, and a new one, using
present columns and new beams, etc., at $9,058.00. 'That
the first scheme would be the hest, hecause it would
brace the front wall, which might be a hazard in case of
earthquake.
j

Mr. White, not having heard from Mr. Paulson with
relation to Mr. Miller's suggestion, w·ent to the premises
about June 7, 1946, when respondents had just gone into
occupancy (827). It was about this time that he heard of
the ptroject for full span open store (826). He then went
again to see the firm of Young and Hansen, architects.
and went with them to look at the building. It was at this
time that they looked for plaster cracks in the store ceiling (828), and found that there were none due to deflection (830). It may be stated at this point that all the
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expert~ te~tified

that if there \vas substantial deflection,
the ceiling would crack, and no \Yitness testified that the
ceiling had cracked in any part of the main store.
It 'vas testified, 'vithout dis:pute, that the drain system had not been changed fron1 the tin1e that Mrs. White
acquired the property (790), and, also, that the ceiling
was plastered at the tin1e the property was acquired, and
not replastered since. There was no testimony of any
change in any portion of the structure, after the lease
was signed and up to the time of occupancy, or to the
time of demolition, by reas-on of any further ''sagging,''
as alleged, or at all. What testimony was given on this
question w'·as all to the effect that there had been no
change.
After the above inspection, Mr. White talked to Mr.
Wolfe and asked if Mr. Wolfe would discuss the matter
with his architect and with Young and Hansen; that the
latter firm had convinced him that the roof could be made
safe at relatively small cost ( 832). Mr. Wolfe responded
that he would not so meet; that he had employed architects and engineer, and was going t o follow their advice.
1

On June 17, 1946, Mr. Nelson, the engineer, wrote
another letter (Ex. '' G' ') to Mr. Wolfe. This referred to
the previous letter, of May 8, 1946, and that he had submitted two plans to Mr. Paulson ''for replacing this
roof"; that he recommended "rebuilding with a fresh

start."
On ,June 18, 1946, attorneys Rich, Rich and Str"ong
\Vrote a letter to Mr. White (Ex. XX), enclosing the last
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previously mentioned letter from G·eorge S. Nelson, and,
also, from Mr. Paulson, and stating that it would .cost
more ''to monkey with the old roof than a new roof
will .cost," and also stating that "it is the plan and
arrangement to proceed at once with the alterations, including the replacement of a roof . . . ''
On June 22, 1946, an applicant by respondents was
made for remodeling, including the op,en span. bowstring
structure (Ex. "0").
p·rior to July 8, 1946, Mr. White had a conversation.
with Mr. Wolfe, which was the first negotiations that
they had had since the letter of April 3, 1946, when Mr.
Wolfe had said that he did not want to argue about the
matter anymore. In this conversation, aborve referred
to, Mr. Wolfe had said that Young and Hansen could
write out their proposal (833-).
On July 8, 19·46, Mr. White wrote Mr. Wolfe (Ex.
'' P ''), submitting a letter, also of July 8, 1946, from
Young and Hansen (Ex. ''P''), and asked him to submit their plan to the Building Inspector, and also stating that the roof could he tested by loading, and asking
that it he tested, if necessary, to satisfy the City, and
stating that it would stand, as it had stood, for over 20
years. Also, that testing ·for the plaster cracks had revealed that there had been no movement or settlement
of the roof structure.
The enclosed letter of Young and H·ansen (Ex. "P")
stated that the roof was safe. That there was a little
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sagging around the skylights. That close inspection reYealed no recent crack8. That the roof could he n1ade
stronger by trussing~ through and eliminating the skylights. That the cost 'Of the changes suggested would
not exceed $800.00.
I1nmediately thereafter, respondents had Mr. Paulson dra\Y a blue print (Ex. '~ P' '), which, it was claimed,
suggested the plan of Young and Hansen, but it did not
show the joists running through the skylight from girder
to wall, as had been suggested, although it seems this
\vas intended; and this, with the Young and Hansen
letter, and a portion of Mr. White's letter (Ex. "P" and
Ex. 1), ''"'"ere submitted with the applicati'On .
. At this point, the insistence of respondents on having this open span roof becomes even more ap;parent,
because the respondents submitted with the above, a
letter signed by Cannon Construction Company (Ex.
"'P") of July 9, 1946, and they also submitted with this
the letter 'Of GeorgeS. Nelson (Ex. "P" and Ex. "F"),
giving his opinion as to insufficienty of nailing, etc.,
and in the letter to the Building Inspector said: ''the
framing to replace the skylights, as the plan shows, be
id entica.l to the existing framing, and the nailin,g would
be as in the existing trusses." This was to invite rejection.
~l_lhe

letter by Mr. White to Mr. Wolfe had said
nothing ahout nailing, nor had the letter of Young and
Hansen. 1\f r. Miller had suggested strengthening where
necessary. No one had suggested keeping the "identical"
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skylight framing. They had suggested_running the regular truss system through instead. It was suggested, that
any needed additional nailing would be made, or, if necessary, they could go in without removing the plaster and,
using an electric bit, holt, any CJonnections at a total of
all costs not to exceed $500.00 (799').
On July 11, 1946, the Building Inspector, naturally
enough, wrote Cannon Construction 'Company (Ex.
"Q"), stating that this plan, as so submitted, was not
acceptable ''in that it does not supply the necessary
detail for checking,'' and quoting a portion of the Building Code, required that stress diagrams he furnished.
Re:Spondents did nothing further on this, and did
not advise Mr. White that this ap·plication had been made
or so questioned (837). Mr. White left Salt Lake City
July 11, 1946, and was gone until about July 27, or 28,
1946. Upon his return, he talked with the Building Inspector, who sta.ted that he had written this letter of
July 11, 1946, and he read this to Mr. White over the
telephone (839'). He immediately called on Young and
Hansen, and had them contact the Building Inspector as
to w~at was wanted as to st:r;-ess diagrams (840). Mr.
White instructed Young and Hansen to go ahead immediately with the stress ·charts, which they did, and to
take any other action necessary (844).
Prior t'O the foregoing, and on July 2, 1946, pursuant
to the plan of June 22, 1946 (Ex. "0"), negotiations
had bee:n. commenced to purchase the steel for the open
span (934). Bids were taken, and one closed on July 19,
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1~).±()

( 5:22), and the steel furnished and installed Aug.

14, 1946 (93-±).

It is apparent that there \vas a conflict between the
\\Titnesses on both sides, as to whether the old roof structure ''Tas safe or co1nplied \Yith the present Code requireInents, at least for a ~ew roof structure. The Code
requirements were not involved.
\\T e have not gone into detail as to this conflict,

because it is not Inaterial to the points raised, and the
jury would apparently have the exclusive right to resolve such conflicts, if they were material. Also, because
the jury was finally, and correctly, instructed that no
liability arose under the Code or from any act 'Or finding
of the Building Inspector (149).
\\~ e

have not gone into detail as to the testimony of
xir. Wolfe or Mr. White further than to show their respective contentions. It was Mr. White's CJontention that
he was not required, by the lease, to make or pay for
the changes, alterations, and new construction to replace
the existing roof. It was Mr. Wolfe's contention,
throughout his testimony ( 533-615), and as italicized
in his letters above, that appellants were required to,
and refused to, ''put'' in a safe ·or code complying roof,
or to ''make'' such a roof, or to ''construct'' such a roof
in good conditi'On or repair. There is little foundati'On
for his recital of conversations, and he was hard to pin
down. This, however, is the general effect of his testiInony. It was the issue then and now.
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Before the. stress charts on the Y'Oung and Hansen
proposal to strengthen the roof with removing the l~iling were delivered, demolition had begun on July 2, 19f6,
by tearing out the ceiling (Ex. 13). It became apparent,
and the contractor told Mr. White, that they were going
ahead on the open span roof structure. Demolition started
at the West side of the store building, and continued from
there Eastwardly to the sidewalk, as shown by the
pictures. The old interior and roof supporting structure
was taken out, a piece of timber at a time.
During the process, the pictures introduced by respondents 'Yere taken, admittedly to show alleged defects
in the construction, and ftor use upon the trial of the
case. Which, Mr. Wolfe had said on Ap·ril 3, 1946, he
intended to bring (486, 49~6). These pictures do not disclose any substantial deflection anywhere, and show the
laminated girde·rs as perfectly straight. All of the structure, except the posts which were admittedly sufficient,
was above the ceiling. Any of this could have been
strengthened, if necessary, as was the girder over the
mezzanine balcony.
The new constructi!on followed, and was completed
by the middle of November, 1946 (478).
The foregoing statement of this large record ap,pears
to be sufficient for an understanding of the questions
presented on appeal.
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ERRORS RELIED UJ?ON
1. Failure to recognize and apply the la\v that a
party ''Tho, for a consideration, accepts a building in the
condition and state of repair it is then in, cannot demand
or 1nake changes and alterations of these exact structural conditions and charge the cost thereof to the other
party. And, in denying plaintiffs' motions and requests
for instruction, and, in fact, instructing contrary to the
law, both as to:
(a)

The existing roof drain system, and

(b)

the supporting roof understructure.

2. Failure to instruct that the covenant to keep the
roof in repair did not obligate appellants to put it in a
·different or better condition, and in ruling and instructing to the contrary.
3. Failure and refusal tJO· instruct on, or to submit
appellants' theory, that, since the roof of the building
did not get out of the condition and state of repair accepted, the duty, if any, of defendants was only to support the existing roof.
4. Error in submitting case on a misleading f'oTm
of verdict, suggesting and inviting the assessment of
damages, in disregard of the legal duty or delict of appellants.

!J. Error In denying appellants' motion for a directed verdict; and, also, for a new trial.
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6. T·ha.t the evidence does not sustain the verdict
and judgment against appellants, and same are contrary
to law.
('These errors will be made more specific In the
argumeni.)

POINTS DISCUSSED
The controlling questions involved and raised will
be argued and supported under the· following points :

I. A lease -covenant to acc:ept, in the condition it is
then in, an old building for remodeling into a new store,
is a binding covenant, both:
a. as to the then existing.roof ·drain system, and
b. as to then existing pillars, beams, trusse·s, and
other structural roof supporting system.
II. In a lease, the terms to ''keep'' in repair and to
''put'' in repair are words o.f separate and distinctly
former,
different meaning. The agreement to do
imposes no duty as to the later, and vice versa. The use
of terms such as ''good,'' in reference to ·condition or
repair, add nothing to the -covenants.

the

III. Since the roof did not change, or get out of
repair, the only duty of the defendants could he, in any
event, to support it as it was, and the jury should have
been so instructed, and this theory submitted.
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ARGUMENT

I.
A CO·\TEN.A.NT OF ACCEPTANCE OF THE EXISTING CONDITION IS BINDING.
It would seen1 that no principles 1n the extensive
field of landlord and tenant law are better settled than,
a. that acceptance of a building in the condition
that it is in 'vhen accepted, precludes any right to have
such eondition changed by, or at the expense of, the other
party; and
b. that an agreement to ''keep'' a leased building
in the condition in which it is accepted imposes no obligation to ''put" it into an improved or better con.dition,
by construction -of improvements, or at all.
In this field, also, the p~rinciples,, well established
by well considered precedents over a long p·eriod of litigation, have been found to furnish rules which worked
for justice and avoid confusion, and where judicial legislation would necessarily be confusing and dangerous.
~fany cases, some of which fnllow, emphasize this.
This case has always been colored, perhaps necessarily, by a speculative assumption, emphasized hy respondent Wolfe throughout his testimony, that whatever
improvements defendants are here compelled to pay for
will redound to their benefit anyway; that, therefore,
nothing else in the case is of any great importance.
Tt is clear that this "showplace of the West" store
is intended for use, as such, by respondents for the 20
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years, as authorized by this lease. It is showTI that the
building will then he between 60 and 70 years old. The
pictures and evidence show that right back to the rear
balcony, the entire building, except the North and South
walls, was torn out and rebuilt at a cost of more than
$5 5,000.00, including the new steel roof structure (553).
There is no assuranc.e that these old 1% foot side walls
will support this 80-foot s;pan (Ex. 8) bowstring steel
roof structure beyond that lease period. Effort to go into
this was objected to, and, of course, none of the phases
of this speculative assumption .could be gone into.
1

It is speculative as to whether merchandizing practice 20 years hence will make unrentable a sto-re like
this, in this business section; whether it can be rentably
partitioned under this oval roof. It is common knowledge that each $5,000.00 added to the value will add
about $300.00 to defendants' tax bill annually, so that
$50,000.00 added value would add $.3,000.00, as well as
additional insurance eost, to ap·pellants. If this kind of
a constructed building, at thi~ location, had been wanted
by appellants for their advantage, they could have made
it. Such a choice should not have been forced upon them,
in any part, by judicial legislation.
We come now to the law, as we have found it. In
view of the specific covenant, accepting this building
in its then condition, it would seem unnecessary to cite
again authorities referred to in our ·brief on the first
appeal to the effect that without this strict covenant but

'
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by entering into a lease, the lessee i~ usually bound by

the condition of the property at the ti1n·e of the lease.
Tiffany, Lan-dlord (l/flid Tenant, p. 86, on this, says:

.. It i~ agreed b~~ the authorities at the present
tin1e that a~ a general rule there is no obligation
on the part of the le~~or to ~ee that the premises
are at the ti1ne of the deu1ise in a. condition of
fitne~~ for use for the purposes for which the
les~ee 1nay propose to use them. A lessee, like
the purcha~er of a thing already in existence, is
prestuned to ·take only after examination. The
nlaxinz ca.veat e·rnptor applies, and if he desires
to protect hin1self in this regard he must exact
of the lessor an express stipulation as to the condition of the premises. Accordingly a landlord is
not bound, as a general rule, in the absence of
special stipulation, to make repairs or improveInents on the premises in order to render then1
safe or fit the1n for the tenant's use."
This court approved this rule on the first appeal.
Also in our brief on first appeal, we cited authorities for the prop·ositi:on that the accep·tance of a building,
as is, included the acceptance of any structural defects,
and that this would also go to any subsequent changes
resulting from these then existing defects.
On these, we quoted 32 Am. Jur., p. 515, as follows:
''A lessee takes the hired premises, in the
absence of warranty, fraud, or 1nisrep-resentation,
in the condition and qualit:v in which they are.
The tenant takes the property as he finds it, \vith
all existing defects which he knovvs or can ascertain by reasonable inspection. He takes the risk
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of apparent defects. As between hiins.elf and his
landlord, where there is no fraud or false representation or deceit, and in the absence of an express warranty or covenant to repair, there is no
implied contract that the prernises are suitable
or fit for :occupation or for the particular use
intended, or that they are safe for use. Any implied contract relates only to the estate, 'and not
to the condition, of the property. In other words,
in the ahs.ence of fraud or concealment :on the part
of the landlord, a rule similar to that of caveat
emptor applies and throws upon the lessee the responsibility of examining as to the existence of
defects in the premises and of providing against
their ill effects. The gerner"<al rule that there is no
·warranty of fitn.ess or as to the conditvon .of the
premises jwpvplies to d.efects in the construction of
the demised buildilng ;and to the p~remises le.ased
for business purposes.''
While such authority was not discussed much by
this Court, this last contention was not adopted. However, it need not be pursued further. The only point in
this connection that is of importance, now tha.t it has
been firmly established that there was no change of any
kind after the lease was entered into, is that the alleged
defects complained of and, allegedly, corrected were
structural ones, existing from the time of remodeling in
1923.
Another matter which ap~peared to influence the
decision of this Court, in ruling upon the demurrer, and
which is emphasized in the opinion (197 P. 2,d 130, par.
1; p. 131, par. 4) was what this Court termed ''requirement of building authorities.''
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, . V"ltile the reference and the authorities cited therefor in these paragraphs did not a:ppear to us to support
the Court's conclusions, as to any such requirement
that Inight have beeo1ne involved under the circumstances
here, this phase is entirely out of the case now, under
the 9th instruction of the Court ( 149) that ~'the defendants, only obligation was as provided in the lease,'' and
\vhich has elintinated any liability arising out of any
alleged or assumed requirements of building authorities.
Another point \Yhich we raised, and which need not
be considered now, is the point that a covenant to keep in
repair a portion of a building, which was later demolished, leaves nothing on which the covenant to rep~air
can operate.
Another point urged on the appeal, and discussed
at length by this Court ( p. 131, par. 3), need not be con~idered on this appeal, for reasons which will he amp~li
fied under Point II. This dealt with the "last 10 year"
provision of the lease.
We have referred to the above matters for the purposes of clarification as to the former opinion, and to
narrow the issues to the points which we consider are
now determinative of the case on the record here.

It cannot be too forceably emphasized that there was
no warranty of fitness of this building by a,ppellarnt,s.
None can be implied, and there is none in the le~ase.
The covenant of acceptance, for a valuable consideration, of the building in the ''condition and state of
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rep~air ''

it is in, also plainly negatives any such conten-

tion.
In the case of Robinson v. Wilson (Wash. 1918), 173
P. 331, the Court says :
''We think it will not be questioned that the
landlord is not a guarantor of the fitness of a
building for the purpose for which it is leased,
unless he binds himself by written contract.''
The Court quotes with approval the statement from
Tiffany on Landlord arn.d T e'I'IAa/nt, P'· 86, as we quote it
above.
The Court then continues :
''The trouble in this case is that we are asked
to make a can-tract grounded in the equities incident to subsquent events, where the parties who
might have forseen eveTy incident and circumstances now relied on failed to guard against
them in their written contract... It may at times
result in inequity, but the law is written that the
landlord is not bound beyond the terms of his
lease, and the parties who enter into written contracts are presumed to have in contemplation
probable consequence and the established principles of the law.''

I - (a)- THE DRAIN
This phase will he considered first.
The allegations as to the roof drain are generally
that it was inadequate to take the water off the roof,
thereby adding weight thereto (38), and did not take
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the "·ater a \Yay fro1n the building, so that the sa1ne
seeped into the basement.
The evidence sho\vs that respondents first wanted
a "dra\Y or drip gutter'" at the rear, a pipe line fro1n
the rear to the front of the building, and something to
n1ake a free flo\Y of water away from the building, and
their architect suggested the need of additional drains
(Ex. 7).
Respondent ,\. .olfe's correspondence and testimony
on this matter is summed up in his demand that respondents ''put the roof . . . in safe and proper condition''
and make the roof safe and in good condition.'' The
respondents allegedly did this by taking out the old structure and putting in a new one.
The evidence is conclusive that these drain conditions as comp~lained of, were then exactly and in every
respect as they were when the lease was signed, and
\vhen this roof was installed in 1937, and as it was until
torn out.
It is appellants' contention that, under the law
and these allegations and the evidence, respondents did
not have the right to require them to construct any of
the additional improvements first demanded, or to reconstruct the building structure, as was done. That the
Trial Court, by the instructions, erroneoulsy adopted the
theory that respondents had such a right, and that appellant had the duty to comply with his de1nands, and that
the jury could find that their failure to do so constituted
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an actionable delict. No ap~pellate Court, and no authority on this subject, we believe, has so held.
As there will be no question as to this point being
fully reserved, we simply refer to the recorded citations ~above i:ri the "History of Litigation," and to our
exceptions ( 993-9'94), to the instructions 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 13
and 14 at the pages above cited. The exceptions to the
failure to give the instructions referred to were taken
(994-995).

Our request for special interrogatories, asking the
jury if there had been any change, was denied (116),
as was our se~parate motion, at the end, to withdraw
from consideration by the jury all questions of liability
relating to the drain, on the grounds therein stated, and
to which we call the Court's attention now (973)w
The form of verdict on which the case went to the
jury (165), over our objection (996), plainly indicates
to the jury that it was to so proceed and to assess damages; that we were charged with liability, regardless of
the conditions accepted, and with the obligati'Ons of ''puttJiJng the roof in good condition and repair." After reciting that, if the jurors "find the issues in favor of
the plaintiffs . . . render verdicts as follows.'' 'This
recites:
''1. With respe·ct to putting the roof in good
condition and repair we render our verdict in
favor ·of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants
on account thereof in the sum of $----------------·''
It goes on in the same way as to other of respondents'
claims for damages.
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So that, the right of respondents clain1ed, and a.s
adopted and sustained by the Court, and on which damag·es \Yere assessed, \vas the right, after acceptance for
adequate consideration of this old building in the condition it was in, to turn right around and demand that it
be dput," "Inade, •• or ~~placed" in a different condition.
Such condition as the jury might consider "good condition and repair,'' and to require us to ''remedy amy
defects," if any there were (145-146), and to "make it
reasonable safe and adequate" (147).
We will now support the contention that the respon'
dents, under this lease, did not have such a right, and
that we are, therefore, entitled to p~revail on this point.
A stronger covenant of acceptance of conditions
could hardly be drawn. The contract said (11):

"6. In consideration of the rental herein
fixed, the Lessees agree to and do hereby accept
said premises in the condition and state of repair
.
th ey are now In,
. . ."
If this is not an acceptance of all the structural eonditions, then, it would seem, there could be no case in which
such covenant could he made effective.
The evidence, as shown in the statement supra, emphasizes that both parties clearly understood that this
rental consideration was substantial and important in
entering into this constract. This is n'Ot in disp·ute.
The first case that we shall rely upon on this, and
thP other points raised, is the decision of this Court in
this case on first appeal (197 P. 2d 125). This decision
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will be more a.pprop.riately analyzed in the next division
(b) under this point I. We cannot see that there was
anything ne:c.essarily decided, or that wa.s decided, which
would give the right to respondent, as claimed and allowed on the trial, })1articularly now that the claim based
on ''requirements of building authorities,'' as referred
to in the opinion of th~s court, and on which it was misled,
was no longer in the case.

Urnderhill, Landlord &

Tenarn.t~

Page 782:

"In the lease of a factory, store, dwelling or other
building, there is no imp·lied warranty on the part of
the landlord that the building is safe, tenantable or
reasonably suitable for the purpose for which it is to
be used by the lessee, nor is there any implied warranty
that it shall continue to be fit for the purpose to which
the lessee intends to put it. In the ahsenc.e of fraud or
concealment by the landlord at the time of the letting
of the condition of the building,· the rule of caveat emptor
applies.''

Kingste,ad v. Wright County, 133 N. W. 3'99:
Here the covenant was ''to keep the building In
repair.'' Question was who was liable f:or the cost of
putting in a drain and sewer connection.
The :court said:
''This did not impose upon him an obligation
to make improvements or betterments. Harris v.
Corlies, 41 N.W. 940, 2 L.R.A. 349. The defendant
took the pre1nises in their eondition when the
contract was rnade, the building was not then out
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of repair, and the covenant for repairs can be referred only to 8UCh defects in the building as
subsequent!~~ a ro8e, injury or drunage arising
fro1n the elements, or natural decay incident to
the property and its use. The fact that the building at the tiine the contract was entered into had
no se,Yer eonnection or drain to carry off water
con1ing into the base1nent did not render it out
of repair \Yithin the 1neaning of the contract.
Such a drain was no part of the premises and to
put one in ,,~ould constitute not a repair but an
i1nproven1ent and clearly not required under the
covenant to keep in repair. 34 Cyc. 1336, 24 Cyc.
1028.''

W·alker v. Cosgrove (Ky. 1925), 273 S.W. 450:
Tenant agreed to take g·ood care of said prroperty, to
cause or permit no waste, to pay for all ordinary rep-airs.
The Court said:
''If the property was in had shape and the
drainage pipes were in a dilapidated condition at
the time appellee Cosgrove leased the premises
from Perkins, we do not think he was obligated
under his contract to restore the waste pip·e. It was
not the duty of the tenant to add a drain pipe
\vhere none had been before or make new one
that was decayed and useless at the time he went
into possession, hut only to make ordinary repairs
such as resulted from and were made necessary
by and from reasonable use of the premises.''

Hartris v. Lewiston Trust Co. (Pa) 191 A. 34, 110
A.L.R. 749:
"We have held repeatedly that a tenant takes
the property as he finds it, with all existing deSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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fects which he knows ·or can ascertain by reasonable inspection. This is so even though the premises are in a condition called ruinous. Robbins
v. Jones, 15 C. B. (N.S.) 221, 240. 'Vhere the
entire possession and enjoyment of property are
transferred by landlord to tenant, the rule 'Of
caveat emptor applies. As was said by 1\fr. Justice Sharswood in Moore v. Weber, 71 Pac., 429,
10 Am. Rep. 708, 'The lessee's eyes are his bargain. He is bound to examine the premises he
rents, and secure himself by covenants, to repair
and rebuild. ' ' '

DriV'er v. M axw·ell, 56 Ga. 11 :
Under Georgia statute the duty to repair was on
the landlord. In this case it was held :

'' *

where the premises, by reason of
patent defects, known alike to both parties, are,
at the time they are ·offered for rent, out of repair
and unfit for safe or comfortable use, the tenant
ought to reject them if he is not satisfied to accept them as they are ; and if he does accept them,
no matter what price he· agrees to pay, the landlord, in the absence of a special undertaking to
do more, should be held for such repairs only as
become requisite to keep the property in as good
condition as when it was rented. He may well
say to the tenant, 'you knew what you got; I
offered my property as it was, and did not hold
it out to you for more than it was.'' In such a
transaction all the conditions of fair dealing are
met and satisfied.''
* *·

Justice Holmes in the case of O'M·alley v. Tw·entyFive Associates, (Mass.) 60 N.E. 387, held:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

41
""But zrhen. attention has been directed~ in an.y
1cay to the con.dition of th~gs at the beginning
of the lease, it ha~ been recognized as the general
rule that the tenant n1ust take things as he finds
the1n, and if they are unsafe, cannot com::plain.
There is no in1plied undertaking or duty on the
landlord's part to n1ake things better than they
are.''
Dwight v. Ludlow Mfg. Co., 128 Mass. 280:

The lessor covenanted to ''repair and renew'' so far
as necessary the gutter of a mill. Court held tha.t it was
obligated to make such repairs and renewals as were
necessary in order that the existing gutter would do
all that it was capable of doing when it was in good condition according to the original construction. ·The Lessor, however, was not required to build a new gutter or
a different construction even though the plan of the original gutter was defective.
The cases cited under the next division (b) also
support this one.
I - (b) -STRUCTURAL DEFECTS
While this phase does not very fundamentally differ
from (a), there are different cases applicable directly
to each of these points, and a little more chance that ·some
claim of change as alleged, after the lease, might have
heen looked for under (b). However, we have found
nothing in the record of any such change, not by the
loRs of even a nail. The testimony of respondents' theoretical expert, G-eorge S. Nelson (309-365), particularly
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emphasizes that the defects claimed were those in the
original design and construction only. This is confirmed,
but nowhere, we believe, contruverted.
The typical extracts quoted by this Court froin the
the complaint, in discussing City requirements, are all
of allegations (:p. 126) such as rafters being ''overstressed,'' and ''girders . . . undersized,'' and ''trusses
not adequate, both a.s to design and erection,'' and (;p.
130) ''beams evidently too light,'' So that the question
here again is, can such an old building be accepted
''in' the condition and sta.te of repair'' it is then in, and
a party immediately assert the right to have it changed
and reconstructed.
And, also, after so constructing differently and at
great expense to the other party, continue the right of
use of the building .at the sam.e low· rentals fix.ed, as consideration for such covenant of acceptance, and, also, impose the ·additional atnrY~~~J;al t1a:xes .and insurance expense
thereby cr:e:ated.
Wolfe v. Whit.e, 197 P. (2) 125:

We think that the assumption by respondents and
the Trial Court that this Court, on first appeal, committed itself to this erroneous doctrine is not justified by
what was said in the opinion. Such commitment would
be contrary to previous decisions nf this Court, cited
herein, as well a.s to the settled law in other jurisdictions.
This Court had then only to decide whether the respondents, on all their pleadings, could make out a case
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belo"'", if the general demurrer \\Tere overruled. And this
\Yas all that need be,
that actually was, then deeided.
This de1nurrer, of course, adinitted the facts pleaded.

or

One thing that then appeared somewhat important
in the Court's opinion was the discussion there based
upon respondents' contention that they had sufficiently
pleaded that the '~public authorities" had made "requirements'' (p. 130-131), and that such imposed some
obligation upon us. Thus, in referring to "obligations"
in the opinion, and as this term is used in p~ar. 8 of the
lease as to the roof, this semed to have influenced the
Court's discussion. At least, if it had then been understood that there had been no actual requirements by
public officials, the opinion would have been shorter and,
perhaps, different.
It can now be emphasized that this record is conclusive that public authorities here made no relevent
requirements at any time, either as to what should be, or
as to what was done. And so, as stated supra, the Trial
Court instructed that no obligation arose as to any such,
at all. And, conversely, no right, as to such, in respondents, arose. That whole matter, in fact, never was
rightly in this case.
Incidentally, we believe, if the Court cares to examine the authorities cited by it (p. 130, par. 1), under what
is stated to be a ''general rule'' as to requirements
affecting landlords, it will he found that these apply only
to ~uch alterations and improve1nents as are in the nature of additions, things such as sprinkling systems for
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fire protection, or fire escapes, or some such things to
Ineet safety or sanitary requirements, and, perhaps, as
in one, later case, the removal of show window projections over sidewalks, by new ordinance require1nents.
And, we might also add, there is certainly no covenant
of appellants here to make "alterations or improvements.''
Another matter extensively considered in the opinion
was put out of the case by this Court's decision, rejecting
our contention that the duty to make the changes, as
made, was imposed upon respondents by the second clause
of 'par. 8 of the lease. This followed the acceptance
clause, above quoted, and was generally to the effect
that "for the last 10 years of the lease" all improvements, etc., regardless of how necessitated, were to be
made at the expense of the lessees. This Court held
that the pleading indicated that the alleged changes and
necessity for repairs arose before this 10-year period
started, so that this covenant did not apply (p. 131, par.
3).
This duty, as then contended by us, however, got in
the Court's decision at different points. After stating, for
example, that the covenant to ''keep the roof in good condition ... implies that, at the time of the lease, it w~as
in good condition,'' the opinion says :
''The obligation to keep the roof in good condition and repair for the entire term of the lease
eliminates the thought that the L.essees would have
to put the roof in good condition before that obligation fell upon the shoulders of the L.essors."
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This ~tate1nent is, at first, soinewhat eonfusing. It is
the state1nent \vhich, no doubt, greatly influenced the
Trial Court. It i~ quite clear, ho,vever, that the words
"that obligation'' did not refer to the ·p,receding words
''put the roof~'' etc. This seen1s so, both because of the
context, as w--ell as because of the thought being expressed; •' that obligation,'' quite clearly refers to the
lessors' covenant "to keep", as recited in the preceding
sentence, and as quoted in part above, to ''keep· the roof''
in repair. There \Yas no covenant by anybody to ''put''
anything in any condition. It was construed, however,
as a holding that we were to put the roof in a different
condition.
This is not a statement, we think, and there is no
stateinent, either as dicta, or at all, that ap·pellants were
obligated to put this building in a different condition than
that in which it was accepted.
For complete clarification before leaving this 10year provision as to lessees' duty to repair, we call attention that our contention on appeal, as to the duty of
respondents under this p·rovision, was wholly unneeessary in this case anyway. This is not a suit to compel
respondents to do ·anything, either under this covenant,
or at all. It is a suit to establish merely the alleged right
of respondents to have certain changes in the le·ased
structure made at the expense of appellants, under their
eovenant discussed next under point II.
Now we come to something that was and is· in the
ea~e, and which was, in fact, considered as ground for
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overruling our demurrer, and which this court indicated
was a ground requiring reversal. This relates to respondents' allegations of substantial changes in the condition
of the roof occurring after the lease was signed. These
allegations are in the amendment to their complaint (36),
and are recited at considerable length, with italics for
emphasis, in the opinion of this C·ourt (p. 130-131) and as
quoted above. After which recital this Court said:
''The pleading obviously refer to conditions
after the execution of the lease.'' ·
The word ''after'' was also italicized for emphasis.
Going back a little, the Trial Court had sustained our
demurrer before this amendment was added to the complaint. This, then, left us, upon renewing our demurrer,
with the contention that, since the pleading did not disclose that these alleged changes did not result from
structural defects which had existed at the time of the
execution of the lease, they could not have the benefit of
these alleged ·changes coming afterward. We had some
authority on this, and the Trial Court went along with
us on it. But, this Court did not. So, we bow out on this
graciously, because we have to.
And, this Court also unquestiona~bly indicated its
opinion that respondents were entitled to rely upon
and to establish in the Court below these allegations
as to changes, and that, therefore, the demurrer should
not have been sustained below.
It would seem idle to contend that this Court, so
fully and with such emphasis, went into these allega-
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of changed conditions, vvithout intending to rely
thereon for its decision. If the Court had intended to
decide~ and had decided, that the lease itself gave the
right to respondents to have the alterations and imp,roveInents, \vhich \\~ere then con1pleted, paid for by us, reg,ar:dl-ess of these changes, it \Yould have said so, and elin1inated all this discussion. The case was quite clearly
reversed on the ground of the alleged changes, after the
lease \Vas made.
It, obviously, was not reversed wholly on the assumption that the alleged rights and duties existed because
of '·requirements of building authorities,'' even though
the respondent's arguments on the appeal had convinced
the Court that their pleadings alleged such. If the Court
had so intended to rule, that would have ended it. There
would have been no need for discussion of the allegations of changes in the roof structure; nor was it reversed because of the ruling on existing structural defects, as above referred to, or on account of overruling
us on the 10-year provision. These could ·have had, and
clearly were given, no such effect.
Now, on the trial, none of these last three matters
entered into the instructions on liability, or into the
judgment here ap~pealed from, at all. Indeed, it seemed
to us important then, and also now, that, at this point of
decision in the Court below, everything in the opinion of
this C~ourt was out of this case, except only the lease
covenant~ recited there, and the discussion and concluSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sion on these allegations of changed conditions. And
these were also not then considered or submitted.
As to right and liability, the Court had then to
determine only (1) whether this Court had intended to
hold that respondents ·had the right to charge us, as a
matter of law, on the lease covenants alone; or (2)
whether that Court should have ruled on the proof, or
lack of it, as to these alle_gation.s of changes, or, at least,
to submit the issue of fact on these by instructions, if
there was thought to be any conflict.
In effect, the Court concluded that this Court did
intend to hold, as suggested in the first of these alternatives. It refused to consider the second suggested alternative, at all.
In order to conclude that this Court so intended, it
must also be concluded that it wasted an awful lot of
its time and space, and also the time of the litigants.
Instead of saying simply that the Court was ''of the
opinion that the demurrer should have been overruled,''
and remanding the case for further proceeding generally
as was done, it would have indicated that the question of
liability was settled by the covenant of the lease alone,
and that there wa.s left for determination only the question of damages.
So, it seems to us, that this Court must be deemed
to have decided in this case, that to charge appellants'
allegations of change in the conditions accepted were required to be made and established.
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\recall attention no\v, on the point of the acceptance
of rental property in the condition accepted, to other
decisions of this Court, as well as so1ne of those in other
Courts.

W-ilson v. Woodruff, 65 Utah 118, 235 Pa:c. 638, 43
A.L.R. 1269: Justice Cherry states:
''The general proposition is well settled that
in the absence of warranty, deceit or fraud on the
·part of the landlord, the lessee takes the risk of
the lluality of the pre1nises and cannot make the
landlord answerable for any injury sustained by
him during his occupancy by reason of the defective condition of the premises or their faulty construction. Doyle v. U.P. Railway Co. 147 U.S.
-!13; Reams v. Taylor, 31 Ut. 288; 87 Pac. 1089;
Walsh v. Schmidt, 206 Mass. 405, 92 N.E. 496.''
The statement above quoted was ap~p~roved in the
case of Hatzis v. U.S. Fuel Comp~an.y, Supreme Court of
Utah, May 11, 1933; 21 Pac. (2) 862 at 864.
Middlekauf v. Smith, 1 Maryland 329:

The Landlord leased a mill for a two-year term
and covenanted to keep the mill and mill race in good
repair. Lessee sued for damages for his failure to rep~air
and recovered in the lower Court.
On appeal the upper Court held that evidence that
the ·premises were not kept in good repair should have
been refused because nothing was shown as to the time
when it went out of repair.
"Under the covenant to repair generally, the
coventantor will be bound to keep the building
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in as good a state, as it was when the agreeinent
was made, to :rpake good all deteriorations arising
from natural decay, and all injuries resulting
from inevitable accident, but he is not bound to do
more. And where an old house is rented, with the
usual covenants to keep the sa1ne in repair, the
coventantor will not he bound to put it in an
improved state, nor to avert the consequences of
the elements, but only to keep it in a state in
which it was at the time of demise, by the timely
expenditure of money and care. Guttridge v.
Munyard 7 C. & P. 12·9, Archbold's Law of Landlord and Tenant 176.''
LeVine v. Mc~Clenath(}Jfl,, 246 Pac. 347, 92 A.. 317.
L. R. A. 1917 B, 235:

This case holds that a property owner is not, in the
absence of a covenant or warranty, liable for injury to
its tenants' goods by a leak in the roof due to faulty
construction in the building. In this case it was alleged
that the building was defectively and impToperly and
imperfectly constructed and that in consequence of the
defective, improper and negligent conditions aforesaid
of the roof of said building and the party wall and the
cornices around the skylight, the roof leaked causing
damage to the merchandise. Court holds :
"We know of no case in Pennsylvania and
none has been called to our attention in which a
tenant was permitted to recover damages against
the landlord upon the ground that the demised
premises had been defectively and improperly
constructed. If a tenant could recover damag~~
upon the grounds that the de1nised pre1nises had
not been prop~er ly constructed, all that has been
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~aid

in our ea~e about t ht\ rult\ about eu veat en1ptor 'v?uld be n1eaningless.''
.A. California statute requires the lessor of buildings
to be used for hlmlan habitation to "repair all subsequent dilapidations \vhich rendered it untenantable"
and a further statute provides that if after notice by the
lessee to the lessor, the lessor neglected to repair, lessee
may repair the same and deduct the same from the
rental.
In the case of Wall estate v. Standard Box Comp wny,
128 Pac. 1020, the Court held that these statutes did not
authorize the tenant to. p,ut in new work or new conveniences which did not exist theretofore.
1

''Much, if not the greater part of the work,
for which the defendant claims credit in the case
at bar was new in character and was not for the
repairs of dilapidations. No effort was made at
the trial by the defendant to show how much of
the expense incurred by it in complying with the
order of the board of health was for new work
and new conveniences, nor how much was for repair of dilapidations. * * *We think it quite clear
that sections do not require the landlord after
the beginning of the tenancy to install new conveniences, but only require him to repair 'subsequent diZapiaations' of the building which rendered it untenantable.''

Sheets v. Selden, 19 L. Ed. 166 (7 Wall416):
''The tendency of modern decisions is not
to imply covenants which might and ought to
have been expressed, if intended. A covenant is
never implied that the lessor will 1nake any reSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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pairs. The tenant cannot make repairs at the
exp·ense of the landlord, unless by special agreement.''

Commonwealth v.

S~amson

(Penn.) 196 A 564:

Lease provided that in consideration of low rental,
lessee was to take the premises ''as is,'' and at his own
cost to put and keep· the interior in good order and repair
as well as make improvements. The building collapsed,
fire broke out and injuries resulted. In sustaining a conviction of the lessee of manslaughter the eourt held:
''We think the terms of the lease clearly disclose that, in consideration of the low rental and
obtaining possession of the building before the
time he was to pay rent, lessee was not only to
make interior repairs, but he was to take the
building 'as is,' and also make such improvements
as were required so that it would he safe in general for the purpose for which it was rented.
This he did not do.''

Roche v. Sawyer (Mass.) 57 N.E. 216:
''The walk was in good repair, and in the
same -condition in which it was when Grady hired
his tenement. If it was dangerous at all to a person in the exercise of due care, the danger arose
out of its original construction, and not fron1 lack
of repair. * * * Everything was plainly visible,
and in the same condition as when hired. Grady
got and had the benefit of the tenement he hired,
including its approaches, and had no right to
insist on anything better. His rent must be a~
sumed to have been gauged in accordance with
the thing he hired, and its condition at the ti1ne."
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Ga.de r. _;_\"at£onal
(2) 180:

Crea:n~ery)

32-±

~lass.

515, 87 N.E.

~·In

the ordinary lease of real estate there is
no in1plied w·arranty that the premises are .fit
for occupancy or for the p·articular use eontenlplated by the lessee. The lessee takes the preini:ses as he finds them."
The foregoing cases are more directly on the right
of the tenant here, the authorities cited next under Point
II on the duty of the landlord, also support Point I.

POINT II.
A COVENANT TO "KEEP" IN REPAIR DOES NOT
MEAN TO "PUT" IN REP AIR.

This point is ·on the covenant, In paragraph 8 of
the lease, as follows:
~'

F~or

the entire term of this lease the
Lessors shall have the obligation to keep the roof
of the leased premises in good condition and repair; to pay general taxes and lighting assessments levied against said property, all fire insurance premiums and prerniums ·on any other insurance the owner elects to carry.''
( 8)

The point is that this covenant does not impose the
obligation to "put" or "place" the roof drain, or the
other structure involved, in a different condition by
"1naking" a new construction. The existing condition
of these had been specifically accepted. It had not
changed.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

54

We have discussed the matter under Point I, from
the standpoint of the right of respondents, and now,
under II, will diseuss it from the standpoint of the duty
of ap~pellants. These, of course, are closely related.
It seems clear that the words "entire term'' add
nothing to the fact that this covenant was intended to be
in effect only during the term of the lease, and that it
imposed no duty to change anything before the term
started. And, as we shall attempt to show, the word
"good" adds nothing to the obligation, and that "condition'' or ''repair'' means the same thing. So that,
stated plainly, appellants agreed that, from the date of
this lease and during its existence, they would keep the
roof in repair.
In this connection, we are aware that, on first appeal,
in discussing our other contentions there, including the
one that respondent had accepted any ·changes that might
thereafter result from structural defects existing before
the lease, the writer of this Court's opinion (p. 131, par.
4) makes a statement which may he construed as intimating a somewhat different view of these terms. It
is to the effect that the term ''good'' may add something.
This was, as pointed out, on this now abandoned
contention of ours. The statement was not a holding of
.the court. It was unnecessary, either to the discussion
or to the conclusion reached in the opinion, and is clearly
dicta. It should not be considered as binding the court
n·ow, on this point II, especially if it is established that
this statement of the writer of the opinion is contrary
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to the la\Y. The authorities are clear also that to keep
a .. good condition," as applied to an old building, relates only to its condition as it is then accepted, and in
\vhich it is \Yhen the covenant is entered into.
The question directly is, does a covenant to ''keep''
such conditions iinpiQse a duty to inunediately construct
a different or additional drain system, or to construct
a different roof supporting structure T
The terms adopted by Jhe lower court, in instructing
the jury, supra, under point I, as well as by the respondents, · in their demands, required that we ''put,''
''place,'' or ''make'' the structure involved in good
condition and repair, and ''remedy any defects'' therein,
and ''make' ' the structure ''adequate. ''
We had made no covenant containing any of these
terms, or any terms of like meaning or import.

Farr v. Wasatch Chemi,cal Co., 143 P. (2) 281. In
this case, this Court not only held that a written covenant to keeep the floor and elevator in good repair could
not be construed to require the landlady to '' p~lace'' them
in such condition, but held that allegations that she so
covenanted to ' 'place' ' them in such condition was ''in
direct conflict'' with the lease covenant to ''keep'' them
so.
On this point, the Court said:
"The provision of the written lease with
which it is urged that this evidence was in conflict,
provide~ : 'Lessor shall keeip the floor and roof
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in good repa.ir, except as to damages caused b~·
Lessee, at her expense so as to keep said prernises tenantable; * * *'
''Certainly the allegation that the plaintiff
agreed to 'ma.int.ain' the elevator in serviceable
condition in addition to repa.iring the floor and
roof is in direct conflict with the written lease
* * * Evidence given in an attempt to show that
·plaintiff had orally agreed to repair and maintain
the elevator was designed to vary the terms of a
written instrument and was therefore incornpetent.''
There was claimed, however, in that case that a
prior oral agreement to put or place these things in
repair was made, independently of the written lease,
and was intended to have been complied with before
the written lease went into effect.
The Court held that the party alleging this, had a
right to suptport tbis independent arrangement, and in
connection with this oral agreement said:
"The allegation that plaintiff agreed [orally l to 'place' the warehouse in a serviceable condition for the intended uses stands on a s·omewhat different light.''
This Court clearly and necessarily held that the
tenant there had to rely upon the oral agreement, and
would have been out of court on the written agreement,
thus emphasizing the exact distinction in meaning between the terms "place" and "keep" for which we
contend. These terms are in ''direct conflict.''
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\~to

lrest v. Hart, 30 Kentucky 258. The covenant was
keep the farn1 and building-s in g~ood repair.''
"''rhe "·ord keep, seen1s to us, to have direct
reference to the condition of the premises at the
tin1e of the lease, and that the then state of repair
n1ust be taken to be, "'"hat the parties meant by
good repairs. There is a so broad and palapable a
distinction between a pron1ise to ptt.t into repair
and one to keep in repair, that it is impossible
to believe the parties Ineant the former, when
they used the latter expression. A covenant to
keep in repair is certainly no broader than a
covenant to repair, and if the latter obliges only
to make good the dan1age ad interin1, no greater
stress can be laid on the promise to keep· in repair.''

The last sentence of this statement seems certainly
sound. And, in any event, in the case at bar no covenant,
either to repair or to keep in repair, could be construed
as being intended to go to conditions back of the beginning of ,the lease, ,because here we have the specific
covenant of acceptance o~ both the "condition" and
''state of repair'' that the building was then in.

St. Joseph & St. Louis R(J)ilroad Co. v. St. Lou.is Iron
Mountain & Southern Rai.lwray Co., (Mo. 1896), 36 S.W.
602. The covenant: ''The party of the second part shall
and will at all times during the hereby demised term
keep the building upon the land hereby demised insured
* * * and will keep the demised railroad equipment and
property in good order and repair,'' was interpreted
by the court as follows :
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''A covenant to keep leased premises in repair imposed upon the tenant the obligation 'to
keep' the premises in as good repair as when the
agreement is made. Covenants 'to keep in repair'
and to 'keep in good repair as they now are' are
held to amount to the same thing in law."

Foss v. St·a.nton, (Va.), 57 A. 942.
''The covenant was to keep the premises in
good rep~air, not to put and leave them in good
repair. The lessee's duty to the lessor under this
covenant is to be measured by the condition of
the property when taken.''

Stultz v. Locke, 47 Maryland 562. The Lessor had
covenanted to kee·p the mills and machinery, wa.ter power
and fencing on the premises ''in as good repair as they
are now.'' In the narrative of the complaint, the tenant·
alleged that the Lessor ''agreed to keep in repair.'' The
court held:
''It follows that the covenant as stated in
the narrative, is in its legal effect the same as
that contained in the articles of agreement. Or
in other words, that a covenant to keep in repair,
and a covenant to keep in ·as good repair as they
now are, are identically the same covenant.''
24 Cyc. 1088:

''A covenant to keep the premises in repair
is generally construed to mean and impose on the
covenantor the legal obligation to keep the prelnises in as good repair as when the agreement was
made; but does not require him to make repair~
necessitating radical changes in the structure, of
a permanent, substantial and unusual tharacter."
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7

T incent r. (7nrne, (Mich.), 97 N.W. 34. Under a
covenant to keep in good repair, the case went to jury
on instruction that repairs required were those ordinary
prudent farmers 1nake.
d

* * * the test 1nade Ly the contract is not

that they shall be kept in such reasonable repair
as ordinarily prudent farnters use, but that they
shall be kept in such repair and condition as when
taken.''

In Cad/tnan v. Hy-Grade Foods Products Coriplora.tion C~Iass.), 33 N.E. (2d) 759, the action was for failure
to keep and return the premises ''in good tenant~hle
condition'' as stipulated. Actually they were not in good
condition \vhen returned because they required a new
floor understructure. Plaintiff demanded return on a
strict technical interpretation of this covenant. Says the

Court:
"All the plaintiff's exceptions are based upon
their contention that the defendant was obligated
to surrender the premises at the end of the term
in good tenantable repair, regardless of their
actual c.ondition at the time the term began.''
While in that case it was admitted in the lease that
the premises were then in "good condition," it is the
same here because of appellants' acceptance of the condition as of February 19, 1945. The court then remarks:
' 'There was evidence from which it could
have been found that the conditions above described were substantian~~ the sa1ne at the beginning as at the end of the term.
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''The phrases 'in good tenant,able repair'
and 'in good condition' appearing in such lease
do not have a fixed or technical meaning which
is always the same regardless of the character
or use of the building to which they refer.''
Later on the court remarks in referring to the good
condition at the commencement of the lease:
''The standard there set is the actual state of
repair, whether good or bad, in which the premises
were at the time of the letting, not a degree of
re:pair measured by the abstract standard of

goo·dness.

• • •
''It is proper in the construction of the language of a lease to read together different provisions therein dealing with the same subject.
matter, and where possible all the language used
should be given a reasonable meaning.
* * *
"When, however, this covenant is read with
the earlier admission in the lease that the prenlises were 'in good condition' at the time of its
execution, uncertainty as to the meaning of the
phra.se 'in good tenantable repair' disappears and
all the language of the lea.se respecting the condition of the premises as to repair may be given
significance. Thus read, the intention of the
parties is adequately manifested that the actual
condition of the building in respect to good tenantable repair existing when the term began should
be the ·condition as to good tenantable repair in
which the building was required to be when delivered up to the plaintiffs at the end of the term,
exce~pt as to the effeect of reasonable wearing and

use.''
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~\pplying

this ~ound reasoning to the case a.t bar,
here is an a.gree1uent by the Lessees accepting the premises (including the roof), in the condition they were in
on FebruarY 19~ 1~)±5. Lessors' covenant is referable to
that condition, and they \vere obligated only to keep the
roof in such condition. They are not require·d to pay the
cost of destroying the then existing roof and its supporting understructure and constructing a new understructure of different_materials.
ol

'

The reasoning of the foregoing case seems very
in1portant. These covenants to keep in repair or in good
condition, or to keep and return in such condition, appear
frequently. They appear more often as covenants by
lessees, than by lessors. There must be hundreds of
leases made daily, in which it is routine to state that the
tenant will keep the premises in good condition and
repair, or equivalent words. Must the tenant, then,
place the landlord's premises in good condition and
repair, if they are not in such condition at the commencement of the lease~
The rule, as this case points out, cannot be that they
are, by these terms, required to place the building in a
better condition than when they entered into the eontract
relationship concerning it. And, if it was, had then, a
defective building, or a partially dilapidated one, improve it into a good 'One, or one which would be ''in
good condition and repair."
This, obviously, would work great hardship. And

the law gives to these terms the san1e meaning, no
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matter which party is bound by the covenant containing
them. There can be no possible difference in meaning
on this account.

Lister v. Lane, 2 Q.B. 214, 9 Eng. Rule Case 478:
''These cases (old English cases) establish
that, where there is a general covenant to repair,
the age and general condition of the house at the
commencement of the tenancy are to be taken
into consideration in considering whether the
covenant has been broken; and that a tenant who
enters upon an old house is not bound to leave
it in the same state as if it were a new one.
"You have then, to look at the condition of
the house at the ti1ne of the demise, and amongst
other things, the nature of the house-what kind
of house it it. If it is a timber house, the lessee
is not bound to repair it by making a brick or
stone house If it is a house built upon wooden
piles in soft ground the lessee is not bound to
take them out and to !prut in concrete pile.
''However large the words of the covenant
may be, a covenant to rep·air a house is not a
covenant to give a different thing from that which
the tenant took when he entered into the covenant. He has to repair that thing which he took;
he is not obliged to make a new and different
thing; and, moreover, the result of the nature
and condition of the house itself, the result of
time upon that state of things, is not a breach of
the covenant to repair. ''
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EFFECT OF DECISION O·N POINTS
I. AND II.
If we are correct in our contention as to point I,
or point II, or as to both of these, it would follow that
\Ye are entitled to a reversal here. And, also, that it is
not necessary to consider the remaining point.
The previous decision of this court was intended
to, and did, insure that the parties hereto would have
their day in Court. They have had this. And respondents have exhaustively presented their claims and
contentions.
It would seem, therefore, that if we have sustained
either, or both, of these fundamental and determinative
points the Court, up'On reversal, should direct a judgment of dismissal. There would he nothing left on respondents' contentions, as made below, to try.
POINT III.
APPELLANTS' RIGHT TO SU·PPORT
SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED.

THE

R.OOF

This numbered assignment and point is based upon
the error of the Court in refusing to give our requested
instructions No. 13 and No. 18 ( 130, 135), and in submitting the case on instructions and a form of verdict
which failed to present, but which excluded, our theory
as to damages.
The evidence was conclusive that th~ roof itself
never ''got out of re·pair,'' after it was accepted, and
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structure was tested when it was put on, and that it was
tested by the manager of a roofing company, after the
date of acceptance, and before the date of occupancy.
Some slight flashing repairs were made, and it was thus
placed in good repair, as a roof. ·This is not in dispute.
There is no claim that it leaked or failed thereafter; or
that it did not continue to function, until taken out.
The contention was, that the supporting structure was
inadequate, or may be inadequate, to support it, in view
of future heavy snows; and, also, that the drain was not
satisfactory.
We had offered the testimony, as shown in the statements, supra, of a firm 'Of experts, Young and Hansen,
and another expert, Miles Miller, that it could have been
safely supported without the necessity of re~placing it
by another kind of structure entirely. No witness denied
this. There was other corroboration ( 357), and, in fact,
their architect at first so indicated (Ex. 7).
It was shown, without dispute, in the evidence that
respondents' objections to the drain could have been
met, if the changes demanded back in 1945 had been
assumed and 'paid for bjy appellants, amounting to
$485.56 (Ex. 18). There was no objection by appellants
to these changes being made by respondents. There was
a disagreement as to who should pay for these.
1

It is also shown that the skylights could have been
taken out and trussed through, as first suggested by
respondents' architect (Ex. 7), for $800.00. (See Young
and Hansen's letter, Ex. ''P'').
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.:\lso, that any loose joint~, or connections, in the
structure could have been securely fastened by nailing
or bolting, for not to exceed $500.00 ( 779). That these
would have given sufficient support.
It is true that respondents, \Yitnesses testified that
this \vas not the best \Yay to do it (3'57, 332), nor the
way which 'vould Inake the best store ( 307-8), and that,
in the long run, the bow-strin_g steel truss construction
would not cost n1ore. There was also some testimony
as to individual pieces of imperfect struts, or nails, 'OT
single timbers. The jury, of course, under the testimony,
could have allowed something for substitutions or repairs
of these, if they had considered such necessary. The
evidence shows these could have been done. This roof
structure, as it was, had supported the roof for over
twenty years.
There is a vast difference between these figures and
the verdict, covering a complete demolition and different
construction. This was our theory, and the jury should
have been instructed S'O as to present it and so as to
authorize the jury to determine whether the same roof
could have been supported in the manner and at the comparatively smaller cost, as we contended.
When the form of verdict (165) was ready for subInission, \ve rnade objection on this ground, and called
attention directly to this matter (996). It was not
ehanged to meet this, nor was this theory submitted for
consideration h:' the jury, as requested, 01' at all. rrhe
result \Vas that, under the instructions previously refer-
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red to, the jury obviously proceeded to consider only,
and to charge us with the cost of the new construction.
Several instructions definitely negatived our theory
(see 140, 145, 146, 147, 153, 154). The verdict, in view
of instructions like No. 13 ( 153) and instruction No.
10 (150), could have left no doubt that damages "with
respect to puJtirng the roof in good condi tron and repair,'' meant ·putting in the whole new structure.
Plaintiffs' list of claims had been repeatedly called
to the jurors' attention, and, at least twice,. introduced
as exhibits, one of which was withdrawn. The court had
s-et up this list (Ex. "D-1") in instruction No. 1 (139)
in detail, and repeated it in part in instruction No. 14
(154). Under all these, the jury would understand that
the only question was this amount of damage, and it
was already set up for them.
Another thing that had made the presentation of our
theory important, and that also points up that this failure was ·prejudicial, was the carrying, throughout the
trial, of the theme that we were disoheying public officials and violating the City's ordinances. While this,
as a claim of liability, went out at the end of the trial,
the damage was done. Our many alleged acts of commission and omission in this respect runs throughout
the record. First, that these things imposed conclusive
liability upon us ( 619), and that we were bound conclusively by what the City authorities said (779), and
so on.
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~o

that \Yt\ \Yere left \vhere it could be argued that
"·e "~ere deliberately endangering the public, and even
the jurors and their families. They, quite naturally,
gave us the works.
e 1nade a request for an instruction that "~otud have helped on this, and it was refused
(134).

'T

''Te had 1nade a n1otion to strike these things from
the con1plaint, before the appeal. However, in view of
the fact that our general den1urrer had been sustained,
we did not c.ross-appeal on the trial court's denial of our
motion to strike these, and, as we view the matter, as
long as they were in, we could not keep out evidence
relating to them. We were only successful in eliminating
them at the very end ·of the trial, although we raised
the matter several times.

Gihisalbert's, et al. v. Lagarde (La.), 147 So. 763.
Tenants, as part of consideration for the lease, agreed
to pay for '·any alterations, changes, repairs, or reconstruction of every nature and kind, whether ordinary
or extraordinary * * * necessary to keep the pro~1erty
in good order and repair." Upon lessee's failure t~
repair, lessor made extensive repairs. The court limited
the recovery on the following grounds:
"Upon taking up a study of plaintiff's claim,
we are at once impressed by the apparent effort
to charge defendant for everything that was done
by plaintiffs to recondition and rehabilitate the
building, and that little regard \Vas had for the
necessity of deter1nining whether the particular
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tained during the ter1n of the lease. It was apparently plaintiffs' intention, since the building was
quite an old one and not equipped in a modern
way, to ~place upon defendant all possible expense
of renewing the building as far as possible.''·
Our right, in this kind of case, to have our theory
submitted to the -court, we think, will not be questioned.
It is supported by this -court, and by the courts generally.
We cite the following authority:

State Bank of B·earver c·ounty v. Hollingshead
(Utah), 25 P. (2) 612.:
''It is proper and gene:rally necessary for
the -court in its instructions to submit to the jury
the theory of the case as presented by the defendant as well as that presented by the plaintiff."

Webb v. Snow (Utah), 13-2 P. (2) 114:
''The jurors should have been instructed on
the· defendants' theory of the case as well as on
the plaintiff's theory."
See, also, M artitn v. !Bkeffield (Utah), 189 P. ( 2) 124;
Pratt v. Ut~ah Light alf~td Tr:action Co. (Utah), 169 P.
868, 86'9 ; R·aney v. Barlow·, 112 U. S. 207, 28 L. Ed. 662,
5 S. Ct. 104; 53 Am. J u,lr., P'· 487, Sec. 626, and p. 500,
Sec. 649.
CO·NCLUSION
At the end of argument on Points I and II, we
pointed out the effect of decision on these points. This
need not be repeated here. These set up the conclusive
matter of law involved.
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' Te have, also, presented Point

Lll, as one of the
additional errors clailued at the trial, and which was
prejudicial.

It follo\vs, ,,.e believe, fron1 the failure of evidenee
of any change of conditions, that the evidence does not
support the verdict and judgment. The same are against
la,,·~ and, under the~e, and the other points relied upon
and presented, appellants are entitled to a reversal of
the judgment entered herein.
Also, in vie'v of the fact that respondents have had
full opportunity to present their case, ap.pellants are
entitled to an order of final dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,

AL \TIN I. SMITH and
MULLINER, PRINCE

AND

MULLINER

Attorneys for Appeltants
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